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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN M. ALEXANDER and 
HELEN ALEXANDER, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
LEE DELL BROWN, GLEN F. 
BROWN, WAYNE L. BROWN 
and WARREN D. BROWN, 
partners, d/b/a BLW 
COMPANY, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
Case No. 17,339 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of contract. The plaintiffs 
sought damages for the defendants' alleged failure to comply 
with the terms of an earnest money agreement for the sale of 
real estate. In particular, plaintiffs alleged that defendants 
failed to provide street paving, sidewalk and curb and gutter 
as required by the earnest money agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on June 19, 1980, before the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge, in the District Court of 
the Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County. 
The Court awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in 
the amount of $4,500.00, plus attorney's fees of $960.00 and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and costs of $27.50. (See Appendix "A" for a copy of th, 
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek to have the judgment oft:, 
trial court affirmed. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents also request that the award fo: 
attorney's fees be increased by an amount sufficient to 
the costs of responding to this appeal if the judgment is 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Alexander, had been loot: 
for an appropriate subdivision lot upon which they intende; 
to build a home. They saw defendants' newspaper advertis':' 
(plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1) which listed for sale "fully i·· 
proved-lots." (R. 126) The plaintiffs negotiated with Boi 
Sorensen, a salesman and agent for the defendants, to arw 
to purchase a lot in the subdivision. Mr. Sorensen offerei 
the plaintiffs several lots to choose from. (R. 127) The1 
chose lot #5 because it fit their house plans better thani"I 
of the other lots. Plaintiffs• house plans had a garage UI 
opened to the side of the house r·a ther than to the front,' 
a finished side road was essential in order to afford con· 
( R. 1 28) The venient entrance and access to the garage. 
plot plan showed a main road running in front (east) of lJ'. I 
#5, and a side street on the north side of the lot (see 
-2- J plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3). Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On November 26, 1973, plaintiffs executed an earnest 
~oney receipt and offer to purchase contract (a copy of which 
is attached as Appendix "B") with the defendants. Lines 29 
Jnd 30 of that agreement contained the sentence "The following 
special improvements are included in this sale;" and listed 
several possible improvements that could be marked with "x" 
to indicate "yes" or "o" to indicate "no." An "x" had been 
placed in the boxes next to the words "sidewalk," "curb and 
gutter," and "special street paving," among others. Line 31 
oontained room to list any exceptions; the words "no exceptions" 
had been entered instead (see plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 and 
Appendix "B" attached). The agreement was prepared by the 
defendants' agent and representative, Boyd Sorensen. 
The defendants did improve the main road (1920 West) as 
required, but at no time- have the defendants made any attempt 
to provide any of the improvements to the side road (460 South) 
(R, 129-130). 
The north half of the side street was paved by the owner 
of lot 16, Edwin Darrell Jenkins, because the defendants had 
not contracted to provide a fully improved lot complete with 
street paving, sidewalks, and curb and gutter in their contract 
with Mr. Jenkins. (R. 138, 157-158) Mr. Jenkins also testi-
fied that the defendants' agent Sorensen had told him that the 
defendants intended to provide the improvements to the plaintiffs' 
lot by putting in the street paving, curb, gutter and sidewalk on 
-3-
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the Alexander's side of 460 South (R. 157-158). 
As a result of the side street ( 460 South) t b · no eir,~ 
on the south side, the plaintiffs have been unable to co;: 
the landscaping of their lot. (R. 134) There is no deL:. 
border between the lot and the street. During the winter 
spring months, the mud was so bad that plaintiffs were ur.o 
to even get into their garage. To mitigate this problemt 
plaintiffs constructed a driveway at a right angle to the1 
garage and across the lot to 1920 West street. The drive1 
is serviceable, but access to the two-car garage is incom· 
at best. (R. 134-135) The cost to the plaintiffs of cons 
the additional driveway was about $192.00, not includingt 
cost of plaintiffs' own labor (about one day was spent), 
136) 
The plaintiffs believed that the city would enforce i 
requirement that all roads in the subdivision be improved. 
(R. 141, 145) 
The city engineer for the City of Provo testified tha 
the City required that all roads in the subdivision, as 5 ~ 
'! 
on the plot plan, be improved, including curb, gutter, 51' 
walks and paving. (R. 147-149) 
th Current Cost of instaJlin There was evidence that e 
lineal foot 
the required improvements would be $10.00 per 
d t On t he plaintiffs' s install the sidewalk, curb an gut er 
of 460 South and an additional $10.00 f 
t to i per lineal 00 
stall asphalt street paving. 
h ,f (R. 150-151) The lengt u• 
-4-
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I 
' 
. 1 
l 
plaintiffs' lot along the unfinished road (460 South) is 99 
feet. (R. 131) There was also testimony that in early 1974 
ilie improvements would have cost approximately $7.00 per lineal 
foot for the sidewalk, curb and gutter and $7.00 per lineal 
foot for the asphalt. (R. 151-152) The cost in 1976 to Mr. 
~nkins, the owner of lot 16, to put in the sidewalk, curb, 
gutter and street paving was $4, 500. 00. (R. 161-162) 
On the question of attorney's fees, plaintiffs' counsel 
~stified that he had billed the plaintiffs for $962.50 in 
attorney's fees including $27.50 in costs prior to the day of 
the trial. (R. 163) He further testified that he estimated 
an additional $400. 00 in attorney's fees would be incurred for 
ilie trial itself and the preparation of any additional plead-
ings if plaintiffs prevailed. (R. 164) 
Defendants' counsel testified that $750.00 would be a 
reasonable attorney's fee. (R. 166) The Court, after finding 
in plaintiffs' favor, reached a compromise award of $960.00 
in attorney's fees and $27.50 in costs. (See R. 106 and 
Appendix "A" attached.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE CONTRACT WAS UNAMBIGUOUS, AND THAT 
PAROL EVIDENCE WAS THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE 
TO MODIFY THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT • 
It is well established that the meaning of a contract is 
determined by the intent of the parties to the contract, of 
_c;_ 
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which the con tract itself is the primary evidence. As ti:. 
Court stated in Continental Bank and Trust Comnany 
rc- VS, Byt i 
I 6 Utah 2d '38, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957), "[t]his intent snr' 
be ascertained first from the four corners of the instru~e·; 
itself, second from other contemporaneous writings concerri:; 
the same subject matter, and third from the extrinsic par) 
I 
evidence of the intentions. If the ambiguity can be recotl 
from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrir.:.,. 
evidence should not be allowed." (Ci tat ions omitted) 1 
! 
This parol evidence rule was reaffirmed by the Utah t\ 
Court in E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. vs. Brod': 
522 P.2d 144, 145-146 (Utah, 1974), where this Court state' 
that: 
••• parole [sic] evidence may not be given 
to change the terms of a written agreement 
which are clear, definite, and unambiguous. 
To permit that would be to cast doubt upon 
the integrity of all contracts and to leave 
a party to a solemn agreement at the mercy 
of the uncertainties of oral testimony 
given by one who is in the subsequent li~t 
of events discovers that he made a bad bar-
gain. (Footnote omitted) 
As stated by the Colorado Supreme Court: 
The mere fact that there is a difference 
between the parties as to the interpreta-
tion of an instrument does not of itself 
create an ambiguity. 
Burns vs. Burns, 454 P.2d 814, 818 (Colo. 1969). 
The question is not, therefore, whether the 
be construed to have two different meanings, but 
contract r. 
rather •:'I 
! 
-6-
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".I .. 
I 
I 
1 
that is ~ reasonable interpretation of the instruments •• 
continental Bank, supra. (Emphasis added) 
It is also well established that contract provisions are 
construed against the party who drafted the agreement, See, 
e.g., Seal vs. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965), 
and Continental Bank, supra, 306 P.2d at 775. 
If there is uncertainty as to which of two possible inter-
pretations is correct, the contract will be construed against 
the drafter. 
In the case at bar, the defendants provided their own 
printed earnest money receipt and offer to purchase form. 
One clause, as filled out by the defendants' agent Sorensen, 
stated: 
The following special improvements are 
included in this sale, ••• sidewalk, 
curb and gutter, special street paving 
A reasonable interpretation of this contract provision 
is that all streets bordering the lot would be paved and have 
curbs, gutters and sidewalks. The word "special" is used 
twice, indicating that the street paving and other improve-
ments would be different than "ordinary" improvements; it would 
~ reasonable to infer that the word "special" indicated that 
the paving would be more than ordinary. In addition, the 
defendants had an opportunity to list any exceptions or explana-
tions relevant to the listed improvements, but chose to write 
"no exceptions" instead. (See plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 -
f\Ppenclix "B" attached.) 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A reasonable interpretation of this contract pro · . ·
1 
• VlStn· i 
is that all streets bordering the lot would be oavea 1, .. I 
. • • n, I 
trial court so interpreted the contract, and its interpret•·I 
tion should be affirmed. i 
That the contract term "special street paving" meant 1• 
paving of all streets in the subdivision is further eviden: 
by examining "other writings concerning the same subject ! 
matter," as was advocated by this Court in Continental Ban•, 
supra. 
The writings that were in existence at the time of U: 
contract was signed, and which would thus be relevant in~ 
eating what is the proper meaning of the contract, incluae 
the advertisement for the lot which the defendants placed• 
the newspaper (plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1) and the plot plar. 
of the subdivision which had been recorded at the Utah Cour: 
Recorder's Office (plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3). 
In the newspaper advertisement, the defendants descril: 
the lot as "fully improved." This is further evidence that 
the "special street paving" listed in the contract with the 
other "special improvements" as being provided by the defe:: 
extended to all streets adjoining the lot. If only part o: 
the streets were finished, how could the lot be considered 
"fully improved?" 
The recorded plot plan of the subdivision showed botr, 
main and side streets, and thus would indicate that when 
contract included "special street paving" as one of the 
-8-
I 
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"special improvements," both the main and side streets would 
be paved. 
In addition, the Provo City subdivision regulations also 
required that the developer install paving, curbs, gutters and 
sidewalks on all streets in the subdivision. (R. 148-149) 
The defendants rely on the Wyoming case of Kilbourne Park 
Corp. vs. Buckingham, 404 P.2d 244, 245 (Wyo. 1965) as showing 
that a contract, requiring simply that the contractor complete 
all roadways as platted in a certain subdivi·sion, was ambiguous. 
A careful reading of the case supports the trial court's con-
clusion in the case at bar that the contract was unambiguous 
and that parol evidence was inadmissible. The Wyoming court 
stated (in a sentence only the last part of which is quoted 
in defendants' brief) that: 
Inasmuch as no plat of the Ponderosa Sub-
division was attached and no such plat 
was recorded at the time of the agreement, 
it is immediately apparent that parol 
evidence was required to establish what 
subdivision plat delineated the roads then 
being contracted to be built and what was 
the full understanding of the parties as 
to which roads were being contracted for. 
In the case at bar the subdivision plat was recorded before 
the time the contract was signed, and it was specifically 
referred to in the contract; the exclusion of parol evidence 
was, there fore, proper. 
The trial court properly held that the contract was un-
: 1 
1 ~biguous, and that the term "special street paving" meant 
that all streets would be paved. The correctness of the 
-9-
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court's conclusion is further evidenced by reference too: 
writings concerning the same subJect matter. Th 
e trial cc 
properly excluded parol evidence offered by the defendant, 
seeking to vary the terms of the contract, and its decisi;· 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT WAS AN INTEGRATION OF THE 
COMPLETE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, 
AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED 
PAROL EVIDENCE AIMED AT ALTERING THE 
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. 
I 
I 
Defendants' contention that the contract was not an 1) 
gration can be answered by simply stating in full this Co~: 
quotation from Wigmore on Evidence §2430, as found in Farr 
Wasatch Chemical Co., 104 Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281, 283 (191 
The inquiry is whether the writing was in-
tended to cover a certain subject of 
negotiations; for if it was not, then the 
writing does not embody the transaction 
on that subject * * *. Whether a particular 
subject of negotiation is embodied by the 
writing depends wholly upon the intent of 
the parties thereto * * *. This intent must 
be sought* * *in the conduct and language of 
the parties and the surrounding circumstances 
* * *. The question being whether certain 
subjects of negotiation were intended to~ 
covered, we must compare the writing and the 
negotiations before we can determine whether 
they were in fact covered.* * *In deciding 
upon this intent, the chief and most satis-
factory index for the judge is found ~n t~ 
circumstances whether or not the part1cul~r 
element of the alleged extrinsic negotiat~~ 
is dealt with at all in the writing. rf ~ 
is mentioned, covered, or dealt with in t~ 
writing, then presumably the writing w~~ 
meant to represent all of the transacti~ 
that element; if it is not, then probably 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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the writing was not intended to embody that 
element of the negotiation. (Emphasis added) 
Street paving was specifically mentioned in the contract, 
and, therefore, "presumably the writing was meant to represent 
all of the transaction on that element. " 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE 
THEIR DAMAGES BY PAVING THE STREET AT 
THEIR OWN EXPENSE. 
It is well established that the party damaged by a breach 
of contract has a responsibility to act so as to not increase 
the damages he incurs. However, mitigation of damages does 
not require that the damaged party completely assume the duty 
of the breaching party to fulfill the contract. 
Where the party whose duty it is primarily 
to perform a contract has equal opportunity 
for performance and equal knowledge of the 
consequences of non-performance, he cannot, 
while the contract is subsisting and in 
force, be heard to say that plaintiff 
might have performed for him. So one who 
has a right to insist on performance of a 
contract according to its terms cannot be 
required to mitigate the damages which the 
other party will, by reason of a change in 
the circumstances without his fault, sus-
tain through performance. 
25 C.J.S. Damages §34. 
The plaintiffs in the instant case were no better able 
than were the defendants to complete the paving as required 
by the contract. It would not be reasonable to expect the 
Plaintiff homeowner to himsel~ arrange to have a road in the 
subdivision paved when the subdivider had promised in the 
-11-
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contract of sale that the street paving would be provid?i 
the subdivider. 
As stated in 25 C.J.S. Damages §33: 
The efforts which the injured party must 
make to avoid the consequences of the 
wrongful act or omission need only be 
reasonable under the circumstances of the 
particular case, his duty being limited 
by the rules of common sense and fair 
dealing ••. 
' 
The plaintiffs did undertake to alleviate their dam31,I 
as far as was reasonable, by laying a driveway across thei:I 
i 
lot to the one street the defendants had paved. The tria'. I 
court was correct in concluding that the plaintiffs had M 
duty to further mitigate damages by paving the road at the:: 
own expense. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES WAS THE PRESENT 
COST OF COMPLETING THE CONTRACT. 
The rule for measuring compensatory damages, as states 
in 25 C.J.S. §74, is: 
The measure of damages for breach of con-
tract is substantive law. The measure 
is the amount which will compensate the 
injured person for the loss which a 
fulfillment of the contract would have 
prevented or the breach of it has entailed, 
and, under this principle, the meac,ure of 
damages in the case of breach of f' ci:ticular 
contracts has been stated, including build-
ing and construction contracts. The same 
is true with respect to the measure of 
damages with regard to subcontracts. 
I 
Compensation is the value of the performance 1 
of the contract; the person injured is, ajs I
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
far as it is possible to do so by monetary 
award, to be placed in the position he would 
have been in had the contract been performed. 
The plaintiffs cannot be placed "in the position he would 
have been in had the contract been performed" unless ·the damage 
award is sufficient to pave the road at current prices. Were 
~e defendants able to escape by paying, with inflated dollars, 
what the cost of completing the contract would have been 
several years ago, then they will have profited from their 
breach of the contract. Such a rule of law would create a 
dangerous incentive. 
This Court has stated, with reference to damages in per-
sonal injury actions, that: 
The present cost of living and the di-
minished purchasing power of the dollar 
may be taken into consideration when 
estimating damages. (Citing cases omitted) 
Duffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 118 Utah 82, 218 
P.2d 1080, 1083 (1950). 
The same rule should apply to contract cases. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the sum of 
$4,500.00 would be necessary to compensate the plaintiffs for 
the defendants• breach of contract. That finding should be 
affirmed. 
If, as defendants advocate, the damages are measured at 
1974 prices with interest added, the resulting award would be 
very close to that determined by the trial court. There was 
evidence that in early 1974 the cost of improving the road would 
have been approximately $7.00 per lineal foot for the curb, 
-13-
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gutter and sidewalk and an additional $7.00 per linealfc 
for the asphalt, or a total of C!pproximat·'c'lj $14.00 per L 
foot for all required improvem<:nts. Fourteen dollars l\L.I 
multiplied by the length of plaintiffs' lot, 199 feet, y:•' 
a total of $2,786.00. Interest on that amount at 6% for: 
I 
years would be $1, l 7 0 .12 for a total damage figure fort~· I 
cost of improvements only of approximately $3,956.12. Th:) 
does not include the cost to the plaintiffs of installing 
extra driveway across their lot. 
The damages even under the defendants' theory would:. 
be substantially different from those found by the trialc 
therefore his judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT V 
THE SUMS AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COUR'r FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE REASONABLE. 
This Court has held, with respect to a trial court's 
award of attorney's fees, that: 
In the absence of patent error or cl~ar 
abuse of discretion, this court will 
not disturb his findings and judgment. 
(Citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §78) 
Beckstrom vs. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah, 1978), 
h t t f th attorney • s fees [r,:. Defendant argues t a par o e 
by the plaintiffs were the result of an error in draftinf 
plaintiffs' first complaint, and that it is not reasonable 
include that part of the cost in the award for attorney's: 
ble ' The trial court concluded that its award was reasona 
was obviously a · f fercd bj compromise from the testimony o ! 
t. I bl€ ' I 
It i' '''''~ 
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J/ 
tC 
assume that attor-neys will make some er-rors. The cost of those 
ec:ors is as much a part of a reasonable attorney's fee as is 
the cost of the error-free services. 
There was evidence presented at the trial that the attorney's 
fees incurred by the plaintiffs totaled $962. 50 for services 
in preparation for trial, and an additional approximately 
$400. 00 for services at and subsequent to the trial. Defendants' 
evidence was that $750.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee. 
%e award of $960.00 was clearly not an abuse of discretion 
and represented a compromise by the court which obviously con-
sidered time spent by plaintiffs' counsel in redrafting the 
complaint. 
POINT VI 
IF THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED, THE PLAINTIFFS 
ARE ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE 
FOR RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL. 
In Management Service Corp. vs. Development Associates, 
617 P. 2d 406, 409 (Utah, 1980), the plaintiff-buyer contracted 
to buy lots in a subdivision from the defendant-seller, and 
later brought an action to enforce the contract. The trial 
court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendants 
appealed. The plaintiffs prevailed on appeal and requested 
additional attorney's fees for successfully defending the 
appeal. 
This Court, overruling two prior cases, stated that: 
We therefore adopt the rule of law that 
a provision for payment of attorney's 
fees in a contract includes attorney's 
-15-
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fees incurred by the prevailing party on 
appeal as well as at trial, if the action 
is brought to enforce the contract ... 
The earnest money receipt and offer to purchase int 
case at bar provides that if a party breaches the contra:· 
"he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this agree~; 
or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, incL: 
a reasonable attorney's fee." {See Exhibit No. 2 - Ap~;· 
"B" attached.) 
If the plaintiffs are successful in responding to 
dants' appeal, the defendants should be ordered to pay t•: 
plaintiffs the cost of this appeal, including a reasona2_ 
attorney's fee. 
CONCLUSION 
The requirement in the earnest money receipt ana 
to purchase agreement that defendants provide "special 
paving" and other improvements was unambiguous, and paro: I 
I 
I 
evidence to vary the terms of that agreement was properl· 1 
excluded. The trial court was correct in concluding that I 
defendants were required to pave the side road by pla1nti' 
lot. The· judgment of the trial court, awarding damages!' 
failure to pave the road, should be affirmed. 
The plaintiffs should receive, in addition to the:-
1-· 
ment awarded by the trial court, a reasonable attorney: 
for responding to this appeal. 
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submitted this l?it- day of February, 1981. 
CRAQ 6:! SNt!: f 1ct,__,, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the 
foregoing Brief to Mr. Ronald R. Stanger, Attorney for 
Defendants-Appellants, 38 North University, P.O. Box 477, 
Provo, Utah 84601, postage prepaid, this Iltlt.Jday of 
February, 1981. 
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2 
3 
4 
CH~~IG ~;. SNYDER, for: 
HOWARD. LEWIS &: PETERSEN 
A110RNE:YS ANO COUN91!.L.OR9 AT LAW 
120 EA.5T 300 Nolll'TH STlttST 
P. O. !lo:ii; 77B 
PROVO. VTAH 84801 
T'r:L..E~>tO>U.: 373.93·~ 
5 Attorneys for Plain t1 ff s 
6 IN T~~ FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTKICT COUHT Of UTAH COUNTY 
7 I STATIC OF UThH 
ai 
IJ\)HtJ M. ALEXANllEK and HELEN 
9 
1
,<>.LEXANllC:R, 
FINDINGS Of FACT ANU 
CONCLUSIOl~S OF LA" 10 Pla1nt1ffs, 
11 vs. 
12 L~~ DELL BHO~N, GLEN f. bHOWN, 
nAYNE L. dRO~N, and WAKREN U. 
13 B~owN, partners, d/u/a BLW 
COMPANY, 
C1v1l No. '17,426 
14 
15 
16 
LJetendants. 
'I'rlIS IHdtter navu1g come on regularly for trial on the l9tn day 
1? of June, 1980, and tne plaintiffs having appeared in person a~ 
18 represented by tne i r counsel, Craig M. Snyder, and the defendants 
·l9 nav1ng appeared by and through Lee Dell tirown ano their counsel, 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
.t<.onald .k. Stanyer, and the Court having heard the testimony, havin~ 
r~ce1ved tne evidence ctnd tne exhibits on file herein, havin';I neard, 
the arguments of counsel for the respective parties, having previo:si 
I 
ly taken the matter under advisement and naving rendered its iner..ora:,· 
I 
dur.i decision herein and being fully advised in the premises, does 
nereby maKe and enter the following: 
FINlllNGS Of FACT 
27 1. Plaintiffs are residents of Utah County, state of utan. 
28 2. Defendants, Lee Dell Brown, Wayne L. Brown and warren LJ, 
29 
30 
31 
32 
I 
Brown, are partners doing business as HLW Company. 
J. At all times material hereto, BLW company was doing tiu.:;ine:; 
in Utah County, State of Utan. 
4. Defendants, Lee Dell Brown a11d Wayne L. 
Hr own, are rt:siot 
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l Utah County, State of Utah. 
2 5. uefendant Warren D. Brown is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
b. on or about the 26tn day of Novemoer, 1973, defendants and 
p1a1nt1f fs entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to 
Ptirchase concerning property located at 472 South 1920 west in Provo 
Utah, and more particularly described as Lot 5, Plat •a", Ranchette 
8 Lanes Suud1vision. 
7. In the Earnest Money Agreement, plaintiffs agreed to 
10 purchase said property from the defendants and defendants agreed to 
11 sell to the plaintiffs that property described in tne said Earnest 
12 Money Agreement. 
13 8. Said prop~rty was to be sold in accordance with the terms 
14 and prov1s1ons as set forth in the Earnest Money Agreement. 
15 9. The Court specifically finds no amuiguity in lines 29, 30 
16 and 31 of Exh1b1 t "2 11 which in fact is tne Earnest Money Agreement 
17 dated November 26, 1973. 
18 lU. Defendants were required to provide to the plaintiffs a 
19 lot which was fully iQproved including sidewalk, curb, gutter and 
20 
street paving improvements on 1920 west Street and also sidewalk, 
21 
curn, gutter and street paving improvements on 460 Soutn Street. 
22 11. Demand has been made upon the defendants to complete tne 
23 lh1provements in accordance with tne provisions of Exhioit "2" and 
24 the defendants have failed, neglected and refused to make the said 
25 improvements in accordance with Exhibit •2• and particularly those 
26 improvements along 460 South Street including the sidewalk, cure, 
27 gutter and street pavement. 
28 12. The Court finds that the plaintiffs nave been damaged oy 
29 
tne defendants' refusal to make the improvements along 460 South 
30 Street including the sidewalk, curb, gutter and street paving and 
31 
tt1at lhe cost of making tnose improvements would be $4,500.00 for L" wn1~h pla1nt1f fs snall be entitled to Judgment. -2-
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l l3. 'l'ne Court finds that the plaint1fts have not breacned illl/ 
2 of tne1r ooliyat1ons under the l:arnest Money Ayreement dated 
3 l-loven<ber 26, 1973, and they have comµleted all of the requir.;:ments 
4 
5 
Lnereunder including payment of the purchase price of the lot. 
14. Tne Court finds that tne pld1nt1rfs 1 second cause of 
6 action for fraud is without merit and should be d1sm1ssed. 
7 15. The Court finds that the counterclaim filed w1tn the 
8 defendants' amended answer to the amended complaint was flOt pemt:'r 
9 oy the Court at the pretrial conference and, therefore, should oe 
j..0 d1sin1ssed. 
11 lb. ~tne Court finds that the aff1rmat1ve defenses raised i~: 
12 the defendants' amended answer to tne amended complC11nt are witr:o~· 1 
13 merit dnd inappl1caole in tne present case. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
17. I Tne Court finds tnat the pla1nt1tfs have retained Craig M. 1 
Snyuer, Attorney at Law, Provo, Utan, for tne purposes of pursuing I 
tnis action and nave agreed to pay him a reasonaole fee for his 
services. The Court finds that ~960.00 is a reasonaole fee for toe/ 
services of the piaintiffs' attorney herein and that pursuant to I 
the provisions of the Earnest Money Agreement, the pla1nt1ffs are 
20 entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee herein. 
21 
22 
23 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes an,J 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS Of LAW 
24 l. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgraent against the defendanto 
25 
26 
27 
28 
J01ntly and severally in the araount of $4,500.00, together witn 
attorney's fees in the amount of $Y60. 00 and court costs in tne 
amount of $27.50. 
2. Said judgment sna.11 collect interest at the rate of elyn: 
29 percent { l::Pt) per annum from the date of Judyment herein until paJJ 
30 in full. 
31 3. Defendants are entitled to judy1tlent, no cause of action, 
32 on the second cause of action on tne pla1ntifts' 
amended complJir.' 
-3-
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I 
4. Pla1nt1ffs are entitled to judgment, no cause of action, 
,anJ to an order of dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim 
I J \t1ere1n. 
45 
II DAT~D this 3 day of Septem!.ler, 1980. 
BY THE COURT: 
:I ~~~~ 
~~ILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Rondld R. Stanger, 
Attorney for Defendants, 38 North University, Provo, Utah, 84601, 
lO ,.,r-J. 
tc1lS ~day of Septe@ber, 
11 
12 
13 
z' ~~ 14 
" ~l 151 ,, ' 
. ' ~· ~ 16 
i ~ 0 i ~ ~ 
'° ; 17 I 
J~ L 
~: 18 
(! 
~~ 19 1; 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
? LJ
'l 
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7 
CMIG M. SN'iULK, for: 
HOWARD. LEWIS 8c PETERSEN 
ATTOi'tNi;:.YS ANO COUNSEL.ORS AT LAW 
IZO E.>.sT 300 N0"1"'f STitlST 
I 
I 
l 
2 
3 
4 
,., o. Boll: 776 
PAOVO. UTAH 94901 
nu:-oHI:: 373-9345-
I 
I I 
5 Attomep, for Plaintiffs 
6 
7 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CUUR~ OF UTAH CuUNTY 
8 
JOHN M. ALEXANDER and HJ::LEN 
9 ALJ::XANDER, 
10 Plaintiffs, 
11 vs. 
STATE UF UTAH 
12 LEE DELL BROwN, GLt:N F. BHOvlN, 
vlAYNC:- L. Bl{(MN' and l\ARRC:N u. 
13 BR<JwN, partners, d/o/a BLvl 
CUMPAiiY, 
14 
15 
Defendants. 
JUUG<~ENT 
Civil No. 47,42b 
16 1'HIS matter having come on regularly for trial on June 19, 
17 1980, and the plaintiffs having appeared in person and being 
18 represented by their attorney, Craig M. Snyder, and the defendants 
·19 having appeared by and through Lee Dell Brown and their attorney, 
20 Ronald R. Stanger, and the Court having heard tne testimony, 
.21 received the evidence and tt1e exnibits on file nerein, having 
22 previously taken tne matter under advisement and rendered its 
23 memorandum decision herein, and being fully advised in the prem
15
e
5
1 
24 and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and conclusions: 
25 of Law herein, now upon application of counsel, 
26 IT IS HERt:BY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND m;CRE~D: 
.27 Plaintiffs are awarded Judgment against the defendants, Lee 
.28 uell Brown, Wayne L. Brown and warren D. srown, d/o/a BLW comtiany, 
29 JOintly and severally in tne amount of $4, sou. 00 together with 
30. attorney's fees in the amount of $960.00 and court costs in ue 
Interest shall accrue on the totdl amount 
01 
w 
31 amount of $27.50. 
32 
said Judgment at the rate of eight percent (8%) JJer annum from tne' 
-22- 10ti 
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1 date of tne JUdgment herein until such time as it is paid in full. 
2 DATED this -3 day of Septemoer, 1980. 
4 
8 
~o 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
BY THE COURT: 
~£~ 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, District Judge 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Ronald R. Stanger, 
Attorney at Law, 38 North University, Provo, Utah, 84601, this~ 
day of Septemoer, 1980. ,{c~~ 
-2-
-23- 107 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
.-... --------------- ----------------------------
··::n. ----~---------------------:---------------­
n ---------~ 
37_ 111 ,.._ _, r1!o9 i-n:t.o- fo;k "' pqy ti.. bolo.,.••'"""" _.,....,,. ,,.; .. .., <O•pi.10 i•"d po .. i..o.., oo i..,..;,. <>•••''""'·ti.. 0''""'"" po'1f "'•'"" 1ho!I. o!""' .,._ii•• 
18 --~ ........... _ _.. ....... d ...... , ••• 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
